DEWEY’S THEORY OF VALUES

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“Value in the sense of *good* is inherently connected with that which promotes, furthers, assists, a course of activity, and value in the sense of *right* is inherently connected with that which is needed, required, in the maintenance of a course of activity…”

There has been much confusion in the literature about John Dewey’s theory of values. Some have denied that Dewey has a notion of intrinsic value. Dewey has also been taken as a conativist by a number of authors, despite his sustained critique of conativism in “Theory of Valuation.” Moreover, Donald Lee has argued that the value theories of the pragmatists are “similar enough” to warrant common treatment. In this paper I will examine Dewey’s theory of value in detail, in the hope of clarifying its main outline and thereby distinguishing it both from conative theories and from that of C.I. Lewis, another well-known pragmatist.

1. Theory of Value

A. Dewey’s Value Vocabulary

I will begin with a brief analysis of Dewey’s value vocabulary, including value, valuing, and valuation. On the whole, Dewey is in agreement with those who see in value a concept of wide scope. Dewey believes “value” can belong to any object and he considers “value” as a potential quality of anything. He remarks that value is not confined to a “peculiar class of things. Anything under the sun may come into possession of what is named by ‘value’ as its adjective.” Also, all “deliberate…planned human conduct, personal and collective, seems to be influenced, if not controlled, by estimates of value or worth of ends to be attained.” This primarily concerns activities, but, as a term with wide applicability, can include any things or objects of value, actions, situations, etc., as well as different kinds of goods. Value can belong also to ends in view, that is, future objects or projected conditions, including ideals. It is a property, quality or character of that which it describes, e.g. a good tool.

For Dewey, “good is always found in a present growth in significance in activity.” The emphasis on activity separates Dewey decisively from subjective theories of value, as activity is public and in the world. Although desire and interest have a role in the formation of value, they are not
mentioned in the definition of values. Despite some texts that seem to endorse the identification of value and desire or interest, Dewey ultimately rejects this definition as uncritical. But more, he rejects the approach initiated by the Austrian school of values in which value is grounded in the psychological states of a subject or valuer. The emotional and the conative are included in valuing but value is not ultimately an emotional state.

Dewey connects valuing more with action. Valuing is primarily acting in the form of prizing and caring for while value activity as a whole includes valuation and valuing. Valuing more narrowly consists in “prizing…honoring, regarding highly, and appraising in the sense of putting a value upon, assigning value to.” Valuing is more narrowly defined in order to mark off the activities of value in its primary significance as a positive direction of change. As such activity is often necessary to bring what is prized about or into existence, value as a quality may be the consequence or result of valuing. It may even include the value of all of the elements of the situation, each of which has some place in the activity as a whole.

The process of bringing this about involves valuation, evaluation and judgments of value. These terms refer to certain crucial elements of the value situation. “The good of the situation has to be discovered, projected and attained on the basis of the exact defect and trouble to be rectified.” Valuation is one form of valuing, which he identifies with “warranted desire,” i.e. desires actually formed from the many impulses generated by the problematic situation. Valuation only applies to impulses transformed by deliberation and evaluation due to some problem that needs to be resolved “by means of changing existing conditions.” Valuation is used “when it is necessary to bring something into existence which is lacking or to conserve in existence something which is…menaced.” Bringing into existence is a result or consequence and thus involves means and ends—including evaluation of and choice between different means and ends. Dewey distinguishes valuation in the hope of making clear the difference between the value or valuing of present goods, and activity to bring about valued future goods, that will help in a problematic situation. But the process of valuation itself may carry value.

What I want to emphasize is that value is not equivalent to either valuing or valuation. Value is a character of something, whether an object, an activity, or even a feeling. Although valuing may bring about a valued result, the result can bear inherent value. These activities are distinct from the value that attaches to the activity of valuing as such, as complex as this may sound, as well as to the “bearer” of value, whether an activity or an object, although each may be involved in the process. Value, then, has the widest scope, while valuing and valuation are progressively smaller in scope, and confined to activity or behavior.

Valuing includes appraisals, prizings, value judgments and other “ratings.” When something is prized, value is assigned to it: Dewey calls this an appraisal, a term which has the same root as prizing. According to Dewey,
prizing emphasizes the “personal” aspect, including any emotions involved in valuing. Appraisal is concerned with “rating,” i.e. “a relational property of objects so that an intellectual aspect is uppermost…” He compares this to the distinction between ‘estimate’ and ‘esteem.’ It is similar to evaluation as it is commonly used, that is, judgments and comparisons of value, or rating objects, activities etc. in terms of their value. This distinction will prove to be important in Dewey’s overall theory; in this context, its distinction as a mode of valuing from prizing should be noted. However, prizing, and rating or appraising are both activities or involve action.

“What is ‘valuable’ is the object of a certain kind of activity.” The objective is an object of value in some sense because of the activity: activity is basic to valuation. There is a sense of activity attached to prizing, an active quality rather than a quality of a thing. The evidence for this active prizing is caring for something. “The measure of the value a person attaches to a given end is not what he says about its preciousness but the care he devotes to obtaining and using the means without which it cannot be attained.” Activity is a sign or criterion of actual valuation, which involves an active pursuit of value not passive contemplation. Activity is public and observable; prizing something is revealed in actually caring for something, not in mere lip service. Without this caring as a context of support, valued objects would exist in conditions adverse to their maintenance; with it they are supported in existence.

Evaluation is a species of valuing, viz. appraisal, or putting a value on. Impulses are evaluated before they become ends in view. The result is warranted desires or the desirable, which should be desired or valued and is an element in ends in view. Thus we make evaluations of proposed values, ends in view in a problematic situation, which would seemingly resolve a problematic situation. We then act to bring about such results as an act of valuing. The consequence is new goods that have value. Evaluation involves both a comparison of different lines of action and a critical appraisal of them. They are evaluated in an external relation to each other and to circumstances. It involves weighing alternative means as well as evaluating the outcome in relation to expectations, i.e. the end in relation to the results. Dewey considered the objection that evaluation properly only applies to means, and argues that ends should also be evaluated. The ends are appraised in the same evaluation with the means. The process of evaluating alternatives ends with a judgment.

Dewey rules out any “private, introspective view of the field of values,” which would exclude almost all psychologistic and subjective approaches as too narrow, thereby differentiating his position from that of C. I. Lewis. He views such theories as having methodological shortcomings qua private: they are not observable, and thus not subject to scientific treatment. Also, science itself is a form of conduct for Dewey, within the field of values.
He also rules out value as exclusively attaching to an “agency or agent.” By this he means a subject, a valuer, but Dewey also argues against “self-contained,” and “short-span acts,” in favor of considering “the whole span of life.” A holistic element is introduced by this qualification, the whole span of life as the main point of reference for value as well as an implicit critique of the value of short term ends, i.e. as valuable in themselves without reference to a larger whole.

Dewey also rules out value in the sense of an independent entity, whether in the sense of “the good” or the economic sense of “a good.” “Value is an adjectival word, naming that which is a trait, property, qualification of some thing.” Dewey thereby retains the Aristotelian pros hen relation of good as adjectival or a property of something, as referring back to a first in judgments, although he rejects the idea that it is a property of “being.” Value is adjectival and characterizes a wide field of conduct or behavior as well as good things. In the former sense, value attaches to things or objects, e.g. objects of desire, and “to value” is derivative. However, as verbal, it is connected to action. Value as a perceived quality is connected more with some quality of an object.

Values and morals share the entire field of the practical and both involve situations in which better or worse outcomes are one factor, but they are not identical. Value is wider in scope than morals since although both are concerned with improving human life and the quantity of good in it, morals are attached to activity, especially activity in a social setting, i.e. mostly to conduct. Moral goods are a specific “kind of values,” viz. those that “make a difference to the self, as determining what one will be, instead of what one will have.” Morals are also “social,” involving the recognition of others and the requirements of a life in a social setting. Since collective conduct is social, there is a social aspect to values.

I noted above that for Dewey value is “adjectival,” that is a property or character of something. In what sense is value a quality of activity? Dewey characterizes value as “directions of change in the quality of experience.” As experience is behaviorally defined, value is a property characterizing directions of change in the quality of behavior, broadly conceived. Value is “whatever is taken to have rightful authority in the direction of conduct.” Conduct as a form of behavior involves activity and the value of the activity as its direction is a property that attaches to the direction of the activity.

Why is a “change” in direction indicated? Both conduct and activity as a whole may go in a good or a bad direction. By starting a new activity, the organism can change direction, whether for the better or the worse. There is another sense of change however, which involves consideration of the situation in which value questions arise. Dewey connects value with
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“selection-rejection.” Selection of a direction for activity involves a process of evaluation and deliberation. Choices must be made between alternatives and some selected and others rejected. Value is connected with this process, resolving problematic situations. “Good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified, orderly release in action.” One alternative is selected from the many, often conflicting, possibilities and is the basis of acting. This process marks a change in direction or outlook that is projected as good. Or rather, it is enough to do away with a bad or problematic situation with a change in direction that will resolve the problematic situation. This change in direction for the better marks all such changes as identically good. “Good is the same in quality wherever it is found, whether in some other self or in one’s own.”

B. Instrumental, Inherent and Intrinsic

What is the relation of such a meliorist change in direction to what is prized or cared for? What is prized is based in some respect on past experiences in which agents have made a connection between objects helpful in the positive direction of change. They are valuable as tools for improvement and as such they are cared for, i.e. active attention is made for their preservation. I noted above that Dewey favors the good of activity as primary and that of objects as secondary. The relation of prizing and caring for objects reflects this evaluation, as objects that are prized or cared for involve the species of activity characterized by a positive change in direction. Objects are the objective of the activities of prizing and caring for; their value involves the activity of prizing and caring for in some respect. Dewey does not deny the so-called objectivity of the value of objects, then, but incorporates it into a larger, activity-oriented theory in which they are instruments of activity.

Culminations of experience are described in terms of “satisfactions” and “enjoyments.” Enjoyments are values “in and of themselves.” Humans “form purposes, strive for the realization of ends” because “they believe these ends have an intrinsic value of their own; they are good, satisfactory.” Further, as Gouinlock stressed, such satisfactions can be “consummations” of an overall process in which an initially problematic situation is resolved. However, Dewey refines satisfaction or enjoyments in accord with his more action-oriented and critical theory of value. He states that “there is no value except where there is a satisfaction, but there have to be certain conditions fulfilled to transform a satisfaction into a value.” Firstly, satisfaction is not mere passive contentment, as it involves a prior activity to bring it about and as a “consummation” of this activity is attached to the activity itself as part of the process. Secondly, although the satisfaction of a desire may bring enjoyment of itself, it may not fit well into overall values and the activity
requisite to them.\textsuperscript{29} Candy is dandy but may cause obesity, tooth decay and malnutrition. It may have immediate but not ultimate value. Satisfactions, then, have to be evaluated in order to determine whether they are truly or ultimately satisfactory. Dewey argues that there must be a “degree of regulation of valued enjoyments.” This is measurable by the effort that is made to control the conditions of the occurrence of the valued enjoyments, i.e. prizing and caring for or valuing. If valued enjoyments result in interest and a desire to care for them, they will continue to be sources of satisfaction in an ongoing process, in which as satisfactions and enjoyments are attained, new ones are generated. Intrinsic values in the form of consummations of a process of activity are a part of value as a whole then. Humans value such consummations and will pursue them. Enhancing such values may be a factor in evaluating alternative courses of action. However, they are not the only consideration, nor the foundation of the process.

Intrinsic value has two meanings in Dewey, then. One is the larger, “adjectival” sense of a quality of an action or an object, a value inherent in an activity or intrinsic to an object. In the narrower sense, intrinsic value is attached to culminations of experience in the form of satisfactions and enjoyments reached as part of an ongoing process. The latter can be specific content of the former. Experience of satisfactions is the specific content of activities valued in themselves. Lewis distinguishes these as inherent and intrinsic value, and I believe that Dewey would concur. Dewey’s approach to value is to stress activity over objects of activity, and experience is a form of activity, since it is tied to behavior, habit and other actions. The experience of satisfaction or enjoyment is within such activities, not removed from them in a Cartesian world of the subject. Experience and satisfaction are moments in a larger process of experience as an ongoing activity.

Objects of value that we prize and care for can also have a value that is inherent to them. Such objects can be natural but more often are made, “artificial” objects. Such objects are the goal of the process of making or caring for. New ones are brought about through activity that has the object as its objective or goal, and has a value of its own. “Goods” as objects, i.e. qualities of prized objects, are derivative from our activity of bringing them about. Combined, such activities bring about objects as their objective, but this is grounded in evaluation as the basis of the object. The object is, initially, an end in view or goal. Activity is primary or basic to bringing about prized objects as an objective, including the care rendered for more natural objects, e.g. that of farmers for their crop. “Objectivity” of value is revalued by this view, since it reflects activity and the public space of action more than the perceiving subject.\textsuperscript{30}
C. The Highest Good

In the tradition, intrinsic value and the highest good have often been equated, but they are distinct. While the highest good requires a notion of intrinsic value, the reverse is not true, for there can be a multitude of intrinsically valuable items without any one of them forming the highest one. Aristotle’s argument that something can be an end of a process or a “final cause” but also a means to higher ends contains a tension that Dewey noticed. For in his treatment of each situation as unique and as of equal value, he is following the logic of intrinsic value, even if he avoids such language. If something is of intrinsic value, its value cannot derive from a higher value, for then it would be extrinsic. It would derive from the higher value, not itself. Now Dewey is careful not to argue too strongly for the merits of intrinsic value, for he wishes to preserve the external relatedness and thus meaning of good: to situations, consequences, further activities, etc. This includes its relations to longer-term goals. Thus I would submit that his de-emphasis of intrinsic value is due to his emphasis on relations and connections. He does not deny inherent qualities, although even these involve a relation of a quality to an activity or thing, but argues that these have relations to overall goals. The latter are not fixed, transcendent, etc. but are “stable” or endure from situation to situation. This would include the life of the organism that encounters situations, its growth processes, etc., in short natural elements of a living organism.

The relation of the short-term in time to the long-term in time constitutes some of the meaning of the situation. Thus if “highest good” means a fixed, transcendent, singular or isolated end, Dewey does not have such a theory. If it means that there are overall goals which mark a longer-term good and which regulate short-term good, in a relation established by deliberation, then Dewey does incorporate a highest good. If growth or value for life is viewed as a “highest good,” it is a major transformation of the model. For both growth and life are marked by change in which the decision over which they are partly regulative marks a change in the life or growth themselves of the agent. In either case, Dewey’s notion of overall value is not supreme over all other considerations in deliberation and evaluation.

There is also a notion of hierarchy, or rather of degree in Dewey. That is, different possibilities for resolving a problematic situation may present themselves and they must be ranked in order of value by such criteria as which best meets the circumstances or will best contribute to overall growth. The choice is made of a “preference out of competing preferences.” Some prizings are clearly better, and in many cases this is quite evident, e.g. in the case of the health of the organism. Again, certain means to ends may be better as more efficacious, which Dewey argues can be scientifically tested. However, this does not involve an a priori hierarchy in any conflict of goods, for the choice is
in terms of the unique situation: it is competitive rather than hierarchical, temporary, not eternal. As Dewey puts it: “The better is the good; the best is not better than the good but is simply the discovered good. Comparative and superlative degrees are only paths to the positive degree of action. The worse or evil is a rejected good. Until it is rejected it is a competing good.” Moreover, these are valuations, not value as such.

Dewey, somewhat reluctantly, concedes that ideas of general ends or goods develop, but argues that they are based on induction from empirical inquiries, not *a priori* standards. For example, a “general idea of health as an end and a good (value)” is formed on the evidence provided by examination of the occurrence of disease as a disturbing situation and the means of overcoming it. End, good and value are equated in this interesting text. Not only are good and value more or less equivalent terms for Dewey, but ends can be good or valuable. This is the first of many such texts providing evidence that Dewey’s critique of intrinsic value represents a refinement of the notion, rather than its abandonment. The model or conception formed is an inductive generality, however, not an absolute standard. Dewey denies that health is an “absolute end in itself,” as it is one of many natural goods that have a place in a larger whole. Similarly the value of “learning,” or knowledge, which plays a very important role as an instrument of deliberation, is recognized as a general end. The role of general values is as “tools of inquiry into the individual case.” Such general notions may be useful for classifying the situation and thus suggesting further lines of inquiry and methods by connecting the instant situation with similar experiences. “They are tools of insight; their value is in promoting an individualized response in the individual situation.” Like objects, they are instrumental for further activity, as aids in removing the causes of problems.

General ends may also constitute ideals. In a sense, every valued end is an ideal as something that is wanted and does not exist. Ideals arise from an actual situation, but are not a mere projection. For in them is projected in a “securer and wider form some good” which was previously experienced in a precarious way. They are general ends of some kind. However, ideals in the strict sense are the higher values. Dewey made this clear in his critical comments about the idea of material goods as sufficient. If too much of a premium is put upon such goods, “goods that are more ideal, [a]esthetic, intellectual values…are forced into subordination.” Ideals, then, are generic, general ends representing certain higher values. In sum, Dewey advances a “practical idealism” in which the ideal of continuous development is tied to concrete conditions for growth:

Practicable idealism is found only in a fulfillment, a consumption which is a replenishing, growth, renewal of mind and body. Harmony of social interests is found in widespread sharing of activities significant in themselves.
Dewey argues that the end as an ongoing process rather than a fixed terminus changes the time orientation of the activity. Ends are connected with the future. However, activity takes place in the present, and Dewey argues that his theory places emphasis on the present, where it belongs. Dewey regards it as “tragic” that the present is sacrificed to a remote future. He argues that “good, happiness is found in the present meaning of activity….” and that sacrificing the present to the future has bad consequences. Value as a quality, is to be found in present experiences, “for distinction, quality, is a matter of present meaning.” In dealing with a problematic situation the stress ought to be on the present. The location of value in present activity is part of Dewey’s critique and transformation of the means-ends relation.

2. Bringing About

Valuing as primarily connected with activity is a complicated process. I will analyze some of the elements or aspects of this process below, but it should be noted first that each of these elements has its own value as well as the value it contributes to the whole process. Or, perhaps better, its value is the “value for,” the instrumental value it has in the process of activity. Its instrumental value is in accordance with the wide scope value terms have in Dewey’s view: each of the elements may be said to come under the scope of value as instruments or elements in the value situation taken as a whole. The good is primarily instrumental in just this relation, i.e. as an element in a larger whole to which it serves an instrumental function, whether an ideal, a general end, an object or an activity. “Value in the sense of good is inherently connected with that which promotes, furthers, assists a course of activity….”

How do desires in valuation differ from facts? Dewey argues that valuations differ from other facts in that the presence of desire for some object, an end-in-view that will resolve the problematic situation for the better, involves a lack. The object which will fulfill the need or satisfy the desire is not itself a fact. Rather, it must be “made” a fact or brought into existence. “Because valuations in the sense of prizing and caring for occur only when it is necessary to bring something into existence which is lacking, or to conserve in existence something…valuation involves desiring.” Desire is the root of technical changes, which bring about new objects. This involves a whole process, which is missed by more contemplative theories of value and touches on the relation of values and facts in a brilliant way, for which Dewey has not, as far as I know, received any credit. Valuation is the source of a whole class of facts as their ground. Desire, a felt lack, motivates the search for means and ends to fill the lack. Creativity of some type distinguishes valuation.
Activity aims at preserving a good, caring for or prizing what is unstable; or creating more goods, bringing about a superior resolution to a problematic situation. Bringing something into existence to satisfy a lack can be referred to as “actualization,” by contrast with potential existence: what has actually been brought about. “Intelligent action is not concerned with the bare consequences of the thing known, but with consequences to be brought into existence by action conditioned on the knowledge.”44 Thus actualization is the special form of activity connected with the value situation which generally involves action as a means. Actualization is the means to a special but crucial class of facts, namely, created facts, facts in the original sense of deeds, those that make life worthwhile.45 As a form of action, it is knowable both as itself observable and by its consequences. Moreover, Dewey argues that this does not subordinate morals to facts, which would separate ideal standards from customs. He argues that “morality resides not in perception of fact, but in the use made of its perception.” By being known, facts have changed context, as they have entered a “context of foresight and judgment of better and worse.”46 In a sense facts are derived from morals for Dewey as what is brought into existence, deeds or facts in the original sense, is regulated by morals.

In turn, objects brought into existence, such as tools, are used as instruments for further activity. The good that attaches to objects is as instruments that function.47 Tools function more or less well. Those that function properly or well are prized. They must be cared for or may break or disintegrate and must then be replaced, starting the process over again. Thus the relation of activity and objects, to which value attaches in the primary and secondary sense, is also part of an ongoing process. It includes the culmination or consummation of experience, i.e. intrinsically valued experiences, in ongoing events in the natural environment. However, the process is not based on or grounded in intrinsic value.

To transform a wish into a means requires a study of the conditions which make the existing situation possible, i.e. a study or judgment connecting an end-in-view to some means which will effect the end-in-view. Dewey views the connection of means to ends as one of the central problems of philosophy. In particular it is the “interaction” of judgment of ends with knowledge of means. The process by which they are brought together Dewey calls, following the tradition, deliberation. Deliberation includes evaluation and judgment, but is not equivalent to them. The role of deliberation is to consider “various alternative desires (and hence end-values) in terms of conditions that are means….” In short, the relation of means to ends is parallel to that of cause and effect, and the causal sequence is a means to a consequence that will effect an end-in-view. Deliberation includes consideration of which alternative means will effect the end-goal.

However, it should be pointed out that the end-in-view is formed distinctly, apart from consideration of cause and effect, although in relation to it. Deliberation includes tying ends-in-view to cause and effect, but is distinct.
Dewey has separated the constitution of ends-in-view from cause and effect, an implicit qualification of Aristotle. As deliberation involves consideration of the means-end relation, a traditional office of reason, Dewey notes the instrumental role of reason in deliberation. This includes the “narrow” role of making a logical connection between a means and a fixed end-in-view and a “wide” role. The wide role of reason “regards the end-in-view in deliberation as tentative and permits…encourages the coming into view of consequences which will transform it and create a new purpose and plan.”\footnote{48} Not just the immediate means and end but further connections and meaning are sought. The use of general principles which will aid in resolution of the problematic situation and create links to other, like circumstances may also be involved.\footnote{49}

Evaluation and judgments of value may precede the activity of actualization, the bringing into existence of new values. It is in this respect that the title of one of the chapters of *The Quest for Certainty*, “the Construction of Good,” can be read. Good can be constructed as an object, which is actualized as a result, as activity that improves the problematic situation and thus, increases the good. The good is constructed as a project over a lifetime, as the judgments that collectively result in continuing growth.

3. Conclusion

Above all, traditional morals have ignored actual conditions and full consideration of consequences. Dewey traces this all the way back to Aristotle, who he believes avoided inquiry into actual conditions and suitable means.\footnote{50} The Aristotelian attribution of value or good to being is the beginning of the separation of value from action, which should be its primary locus. This relation accounts for what Dewey perceives as the lack of progress in value theory as compared with natural science. The standards and ideals of value lie “outside actual valuations,” as they are tied to singular, fixed ends. Consideration of consequences has been evaded in favor of establishing relations to fixed ideals. The result has been the modern separation of will from actions, of feelings from consequences. Values in the modern period are not based on action, what men do, but on a relation to the knower. The theoretical has been valorized at the expense of the practical; the ideal at the expense of the actual. Modern thought has accentuated the divide between ultimate values and natural objects and goods. By separating morals from science, it has completely subjectivized value.\footnote{51} Dewey’s theory of value is that the good consists in a positive direction of change. Thus it is tied primarily to action, the agency of change for the better. The good that attaches to objects is as instruments that function. Objects are prized and cared for in an ongoing process, including intrinsically valuable experiences of satisfaction and enjoyment. These are part of a larger whole in the form of a life in which growth in a positive direction is the overall inclusive value. Thus
experiences of intrinsic value in life are within a naturalistic context: Dewey presents a consistent naturalism. He has thereby clarified value theory as well as expanded it by making some important distinctions, especially between value, valuing and valuation.

The end-in-view or objective is the instrument of activity aimed at bringing new results about. This delimits the sphere of value as unique by virtue of actualization: of bringing about new facts, objects, objectives and results. Value is primarily connected with action in the sense of valuing. Action is the actual agency of bringing about value in making and virtue. Value is a guide or instrument for action at the same time that action incorporates value into objects by bringing them about for the sake of rectifying a problematic situation. The value characterizing the action as a positive direction of change is the cause of the value of the object actualized. Practice is basic as the cause of the object of value: the good as cause in making. It is the condition of improvement of the problematic situation: meliorism. Value is the focus of change marking the novel, the gateway to the new world of the future. Value is regulative over what will come about and thus of destiny. But value is within the world for it cannot go beyond the potentialities of what is naturally possible. What is brought about will be within the natural world.

In summary, Dewey’s treatment of the means-end continuum argues that ends can always be instrumental. As ends can later be means, the distinction of ends and means is not absolute but relative to circumstances. “Actual consequences, that is, effects which have happened in the past, become possible future consequences of acts still to be performed.” What is an end in one situation may be a means in another. This point was accepted by some figures in the tradition, of course, but Dewey’s emphasis of this feature allows him to criticize transcendent ends as incompatible with it. “In a strict sense, an end-in-view is a means in present action; present action is not a means to a remote end.” In this sense, Dewey can rightly call his position “instrumentalism,” as ends are instrumental both as means to or motive for some present objective and, when achieved as consequences, as possible future means. Even general ends and notions of general value are conceived of as instrumental in a situation. The value is in relation to a situation and partly defined in terms of that situation. Growth of an organism or the value of health can be in a different direction in one situation than in another.

Further, he has developed a plausible account of the relation of is and ought, of fact and value in which they are not in separate universes. The ought or ideational is brought into existence or actuality through activity. The valuable is the ground of new facts in the form of new technologies and the objects made possible by these. The latter are prized and cared for, reflecting past values. Values, in turn, reflect a critical evaluation of desires, a natural fact. In sum, Dewey has incorporated the conative theory, as desire may ultimately be what moves one to action in the problematic situation. However,
it is not a conative theory of value, in that desire must be critically transformed by other elements in the value situation. Conation is a condition but not sufficient for valuation.

Dewey did not adopt conativism so much as transform it. He stressed intelligent deliberation about forming desires to give them warrant: the “desirable.” Thus there is a normative element in what is a warranted desire. As far as comparing him to the other pragmatists, he rejects the subjective turn that C. I. Lewis took in value theory. The stress is on action, not feeling. Warrant comes from successful adaptation of organism to the environment in a problematic situation far more than momentary satisfactions, although he does not reject the latter. His emphasis is on valuing over value.

The office of philosophy in this context is to revise traditional judgments of value and to project “ideas about values which might be the basis of a new integration of human conduct.” Conduct is to be based on ideas about values in this vision: a consequentialist model.
NOTES


2. Beardsley, M., “Intrinsic Value,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 26, 1965, p. 6 ff. However, this is a misreading, as Gouinlock, *inter alia*, has extensively documented. (For Gouinlock’s view see John Dewey’s *Philosophy of Value* (New York: Humanities Press, 1972). One need only read the first and last chapters of *Experience and Nature* to realize that Dewey did not reject intrinsic value, only foundational grounding in intrinsic value.


6. Ibid., 413.


8. The terms value and valuing are used in these senses in Dewey’s last word on value, “The Field of ‘Value’,” in Lepley, 1949, p. 65-68. These terms do not always occur in texts of the middle period, but clarify Dewey’s meaning for his theory of value as a whole.


10. Although some texts treat them as equivalent. See “Theory of Valuation,” p. 385.

11. “Theory of Valuation,” p. 404, 409, 435 and 440. ‘Valuation’ is not used in “The Field of Value,” (1949); Dewey wants to reduce the separation of valuation and valuing in the later work. However, the element of warranted desire and its object remains. This is an important text as Dewey’s last published work on value; the “Theory of Valuation” was not his final word.


13. Ibid., p. 395, 397.


15. Ibid., sect. 4, p. 407. This text includes the relation of ends and means in valuing. Ch. Peirce’s original definition of pragmatism in which
meaning is the totality of conceivable practical consequences. For Dewey, if valuing does not result in practical consequences it is not valuing; this involves activity in the form of caring for.

17. Ibid., sect. 4, p. 403 ff.
19. Ibid., ch. 3, p. 66.
20. For a contrary view see Gouinlock, J., John Dewey’s Philosophy of Value, ch. 3, sect. 1. Although Gouinlock’s reading of Dewey on this issue is plausible, it does not do justice to Dewey’s analysis of the distinctively moral, esp. in Part IV of Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1922/1957) where he characterizes “morality as social”); and as connected with activity, rather than bearers of value. Morality is connected with all experience organically but it is still distinctive. A tool may be valuable but is not as such moral. Gouinlock’s view that Dewey denies the “dualism” of moral and non-moral value is true only in the sense that moral values are within natural processes. Moral values are still distinctive as a kind from other natural values.


22. The first quote was from Reconstruction in Philosophy, ch. 7, p. 177; the latter from The Quest for Certainty, A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (New York: Capricorn/ Putnam, 1929b), ch. 10, p. 256. Dewey notes that it is not important that value be considered exclusively as a character of the direction of action so long as the distinction is kept and the relation of values to the direction of conduct is noted.

23. The process of deliberation will be treated below.

25. Ibid., IV, 1, p. 269. This is difficult to reconcile with another text which states exactly the contrary, viz., “in quality, the good is never twice alike. It never copies itself…It is unique in every presentation.” (ibid., III, 5, p. 197). As the former text is later in the same book it may be his final word. The latter text may represent an ontological point, that the good as the occurrence of an event of experienced good is never identical, as it is a unique occurrence. This is indicated by the third sentence. The point may also be that the good does not “copy itself,” i.e. it is not an identical transcendent cause which forms copies of itself, quasi-Platonic style. Finally, Dewey may simply be emphasizing the contextual relation of good to specific circumstances in one text, and the formal identity of good in the later one. However, these explanations may be inadequate.

27. Values as consummations of experience are stressed especially in *Experience and Nature* (New York: Dover, 1929a/1958) *passim*. (For Gouinlock’s view see John Dewey’s *Philosophy of Value*, ch. 3, p. 125.)


29. I am indebted to Gouinlock, *John Dewey’s Philosophy of Value* on this point, which clarifies the relation of immediate and ultimate satisfactions. However, Dewey is admittedly of two minds on this score since he both rejects immediate gratification for long-term consequences and also argues against deferred enjoyment. Dewey argues against “self-contained,” and “short-span acts,” in favor of considering “the whole span of life.” However, he also regards it as “tragic” that the present is sacrificed to a remote future. He argues that “good, happiness is found in the present meaning of activity…” and that sacrificing the present to the future has bad consequences. Value as a quality, is to be found in present experiences, “for distinction, quality, is a matter of present meaning.” (*Human Nature and Conduct*, III, 9, p. 250).

30. This holds for C.I. Lewis as well. See *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, Introduction, ch. 1.

31. For Dewey’s argument that a good in one situation is as good as any good in any other situation see *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, ch. 7, p. 176.


34. “Theory of Valuation,” sect. 6, p. 427. The argument is probably aimed against Kant. It constitutes a denial of *a priori* categories of value, and thus is an implicit argument against Scheler.

35. Ibid. A further point is that such generality may be a by-product of the experience of good as singular.


37. *Human Nature and Conduct*, III, 8, p. 239. Dewey argues in this section that although ends are ideals, they are not ideal in common sense terms, as ideals for the latter includes “the quality of the plan proposed,” i.e. evaluations of means.


39. Dewey, John, and Tufts, J., *Ethics* 1932 revision, p. 229. As this is an early text, it may not represent Dewey’s more mature view. Later texts will emphasize the reintegration of material activities with intellectual and aesthetic.


41. Ibid., p. 250. Dewey argues that, in general, economics does not provide a good model of valuation, as it is a socially contingent form and, on the contrary, exhibits in extreme degree the separation of present activity as a means from future ends in production, where drudge work is without meaning. “Production apart from fulfillment, becomes purely a matter of quantity.” (ibid., III, 5, p. 205). This “empties present activity of meaning by making it a mere instrumentality.” (ibid., III, 9, p. 252)
42. Ibid., I, 4, p. 63.
45. As morals had their origin in social customs, i.e. “specific empirical facts,” Dewey rejects any supernatural origin (ibid., IV, 2, p. 271.)
46. (ibid., p. 274) Dewey notes that the analogy of morals to functions “uproots the causes which have made morals subjective and ‘individualistic’.” (Human Nature and Conduct, I, 1, p. 18).
49. Dewey argues that because of the novelty of the problematic situation, general principles may be needed to avoid “hopeless confusion” (ibid., sect. 7, p. 225). Habit also is a stabilizing factor.
50. The Quest for Certainty, ch. 1, p. 17.
51. Ibid., ch., 3, p. 49 ff. Dewey notes the wide range of theories in the modern period, from a priori to emotive (“Theory of Valuation,” sect. 1). However, they alike subjectivize value. In his view, the main division in the modern period is between idealist and psychological theories (The Quest for Certainty, ch. 10, p. 256 ff.).
52. Again, use of the term “ontological” is misleading, since Dewey opposed the view of value as an attribute of “fixed being.” A better term would be that activity is the bearer or agency of value.
56. Experience and Nature, p. 46.